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SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER COMPANY 
REGULATORS: 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERN 
REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPEDIENCY 
MATTHEW HABER† 
VICTORIA MÉNDEZ†† 
Providing modern communities with electricity is both a complex 
and a critical task.  Therefore, the configuration of the regulatory 
framework, constructed by federal and state governments around the 
electric utility industry, has significant consequences for public 
expenditures and industry behavior.  By altering investment 
incentives, policy decisions around utility regulation have equal 
capacity to move us towards an efficient and sustainable future or to 
impose needless costs on the public.  State regulatory regimes, in 
particular, have tremendous ability to influence utility investment 
decisions.  
The consequences of these policies were recently exemplified in 
Florida, where utility customers will ultimately pay Duke Energy over 
$1 billion in fees—including $150 million in profit—for two nuclear 
reactors the company has chosen not to build.1  How did this occur in 
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 1. Mary Ellen Klas, Watchdog Report Says Power Companies Wield Too Much Influence 
in Florida Legislature, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/ 
business/energy/watchdog-report-says-power-companies-wield-too-much-influence-in-
florida/2172513 [hereinafter Watchdog Report]; Justin Bachman, Duke Kills Florida Nuclear 
Project, Keeps Customers’ Money, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www. 
businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-05/duke-kills-florida-nuclear-project-keeps-customers-
money.  Although the state’s utility regulators eventually directed Duke Energy to credit its 
customers for $54 million of this money, which was collected for nuclear equipment that the 
utility was not able to acquire, this decision owed more to political pressure than legal 
requirements.  Moreover, the credit is dwarfed by the total costs of the project that have been 
borne by Duke Energy customers. See Ivan Penn, Duke Must Refund $54M, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
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Florida when government so tightly regulates the electric utility 
industry?  With that question in mind, this comment briefly discusses: 
(1) a recently enacted regulatory incentive for electric utilities and its 
consequences for energy conservation and industry practices; (2) the 
policy of expediency underlying licensing energy infrastructure 
projects; and (3) the level of accountability provided by judicial 
review of administrative action.  Similarly, this comment aims to 
broadly examine the results achieved and the activities encouraged by 
these legal regimes.  The fourth section argues that the confluence of 
the three policies listed above produces conditions that are not 
conducive to consumer protection or preventing environmental 
degradation.  Throughout, we use Florida as a case study to examine 
the way that these issues play out on the ground. 
I. ADVANCED NUCLEAR COST RECOVERY—A DISINCENTIVE TO 
INNOVATE 
Most states grant electric utilities a monopoly in providing 
energy services to the public.2  Where investor-owned utilities are 
concerned, the utility is a for-profit company, often engaged in both 
generating electricity and supplying it to the retail market.3  
Generally, a state utility commission regulates these services and 
approves the rates charged to customers.4  The purpose of these 
regulations is to protect consumers.5 
Unlike most states, Florida—followed by others in the South 
such as Georgia and South Carolina—enacted an advanced nuclear 
cost recovery (ANCR) law in 2006.6  Through the cost recovery law, 
 
(Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/bondi-urges-psc-to-order-duke-
to-refund-54-million-for-nuclear-equipment/220 0407.   
 2. Douglas Gagax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility Industry: An 
Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 63 (1993); see generally Leonard W. Weiss, Antitrust in the 
Electric Power Industry, 5 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 647, 650 (1973–74) (explaining 
that there are limited competition opportunities in electricity markets because individual 
generating companies also own the “transmission and distribution systems”).  
 3. Id. at 651.   
 4. State names vary for these agencies: Arizona Corporation Commission ARIZ.  REV.  
STAT.  ANN.  § 40-202 (2014), Florida Public Service Commission, FLA.  STAT.  § 366.07 (2014), 
and the North Carolina Utilities Commission, N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  § 62-22 (2014), etc.  
 5. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 583 (1942). 
 6. 2006 Fla. Laws Ch. 2006-230 at 59 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 366.93(2). In 
Florida Public Service Commission documents, ANCR is often referred to as the nuclear cost 
recovery clause (NCRC).  Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause, PSC-11-0095-FOF-EI, 3–6 (Florida 
Public Service Commission Feb. 2, 2011) (admin.  final order), available at http://www.psc.state. 
fl.us/dockets/orders/.  As of this writing, Florida’s Public Service Commission has maintained a 
nuclear cost recovery docket for eight years.  Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause, PSC-14-0384-
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Duke Energy was able to recover the fees mentioned above before 
construction began.7  This section covers three points related to cost 
recovery: (1) ANCR entitles utilities to charge fees prior to 
construction, regardless of whether a plant is ever built, thereby 
altering the utility’s investment risk analysis; (2) the legal standard 
applied to ANCR is designed to reimburse utilities for project-related 
expenses, rather than to protect consumers from unfair rates; and (3) 
policies like ANCR push utilities toward constructing only one type 
of capital-intensive project rather than directly promoting goals like 
grid reliability or energy conservation. 
First, ANCR entitles utilities to recover, prior to construction, 
“costs incurred in the siting, design, licensing, and construction of a 
nuclear power plant, including new, expanded, or relocated electrical 
transmission lines and facilities . . . .”8  Under Florida’s version of this 
law, utilities file a request annually with the state commission to be 
reimbursed for costs incurred, projected, and otherwise connected 
with the reactors.  For example, Florida Power & Light Company 
received authorization to charge about $17 million in advanced 
recovery costs related to planning and obtaining licenses in a single-
plant expansion project for the year 2013 alone.9  After the new 
 
PHO-EI, 2 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 24, 2014) (admin. prehearing order).  In that time, only 
Duke Energy Florida (formerly Progress Energy Florida) and Florida Power & Light Company 
have sought ANCR fees under this statute.  Nuclear cost recovery clause, PSC-11-0095-FOF-EI, 
2 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 2, 2011) (admin. final order).  Florida Power & Light Company 
currently has two nuclear projects that qualify for ANCR: the Extended Power Uprate project 
at the St. Lucie and Turkey Point plants and the licensing of the new Turkey Point 6 & 7 nuclear 
units. Nuclear cost recovery clause, PSC-14-0384-PHO-EI, 8 (Fla.Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 24, 
2014) (admin. prehearing order).  As a matter of disclosure, both authors of this comment are 
involved in litigation concerning the Turkey Point 6 & 7 project.  However, the issues being 
litigated are not discussed here.  
 7. Watchdog Report, supra note 1. 
 8. FLA. STAT. § 366.93(2) (2014).  Note that Florida’s statute provides early cost recovery 
for integrated gasification combined cycle power plants as well.  For comparison with Georgia’s 
nuclear cost recovery law see GA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-25(c.1) (2014).  For comparison with 
South Carolina’s nuclear cost recovery law see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-33-210, 225 (2014). 
 9. Mary Ellen Klas, Regulators Approve Nearly $5 a Month Hike in Electric Bills, MIAMI 
HERALD, Dec. 3, 2013, available at  http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/article19581 
53.html [hereinafter Regulators Approve Hike].  Again, as a matter of disclosure, the number 
quoted above references the cost recovery for a project related to litigation in which both 
authors of this comment are involved. The issues litigated in that case are not discussed here.  
Regarding ANCR, note that total costs recovered vary from year to year.  For example, Florida 
Power & Light Company has requested $14,287,862 during the current cost recovery docket.  
Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause, PSC-14-0384-PHO-EI, 9 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 24, 2014) 
(admin. prehearing order).  Florida Power & Light Company’s 2014 cost recovery amount was 
$43,461,246.  Nuclear cost recovery clause, PSC-13-0493-FOF-EI, 38 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
Oct. 18, 2013) (admin. final order).  The company’s 2013 cost recovery amount was 
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capital project is constructed and serving customers, the utility may 
increase its base rate charges.10 
ANCR includes costs related to obtaining and maintaining state 
and federal licenses, preconstruction materials, and equipment 
purchases.11  Moreover, a utility is able to preserve the opportunity 
for future recovery even if its reactors have not been constructed up 
to twenty years after receiving federal approval.12  Finally, as Duke 
Energy demonstrated, “[i]f the utility elects not to complete . . . 
construction of the nuclear power plant . . . the utility shall be allowed 
to recover all prudent preconstruction and construction costs incurred 
. . . .”13 
In sum, electric utilities that have long benefited from state-
granted monopolies—through guaranteed customers, rates, and 
reasonable returns on their investments—are now shielded from the 
risks of investment in large capital projects through cost recovery 
laws.14  Reducing the financial risks associated with planning and 
obtaining permits for complex infrastructure projects is a valid policy, 
but it requires a balanced approach.  ANCR introduces powerful new 
incentives for utilities into this environment.  Without an early fee 
recovery arrangement, it takes years for utilities to earn back the 
funds invested into nuclear power projects.15  More immediate returns 
and greater financial recovery were designed to spur new plant 
construction.16 
 
$151,491,402.  Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause, PSC-12-0650-FOF-EI, 78 (Fla. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n Dec. 11, 2012) (admin. final order).  Progress Energy Florida’s (now Duke Energy 
Florida) 2013 cost recovery amount was $142,730,579. Id. at 44. Progress Energy Florida’s 2012 
cost recovery amount was $85,951,036.  Nuclear cost recovery clause, PSC-11-0547-FOF-EI, 107 
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 23, 2011) (admin. final order). 
 10. FLA. STAT. § 366.93(4) (2014).   
 11. Id. § 366.93(3)(b), (d), (e)(1).  Note that costs relating to obtaining state and federal 
licenses include vendor and legal fees. 
 12. Id. § 366.93(3)(f)(1).     
 13. Id. § 366.93(6).  Note that, while Florida’s statute provides this cost recovery option 
even for integrated gasification combined cycle power plants, this is not a feature of all cost 
recovery laws.  
 14. See, e.g., id. § 366.041(1) (2014) (ensuring that a public utility receives a reasonable rate 
of return).   
 15. See, e.g., David Indiviglio, Why Are New US Nuclear Reactor Projects Fizzling?, 
ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/02/why-are-new-us-nuclear-
reactor- projects-fizzling/70591/ (last visited  Oct. 11, 2014) (“It can sometimes take decades to 
recoup initial costs.”).  
 16. The Florida Legislature explicitly stated “[s]uch mechanisms must be designed to 
promote utility investment in nuclear or integrated gasification combined cycle power plants . . . 
.”  FLA. STAT. § 366.93(2) (2014); see Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause, PSC-08-0749-FOF-EI, 2 
(Fla.  Pub. Serv. Comm’n. Nov. 12, 2008) (admin. final order), available at 
18_Haber & Mendez_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2015  4:40 PM 
Fall 2014] SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER COMPANY REGULATORS 189 
Second, there are two occasionally conflicting goals in electric 
utility rate regulation: (1) protecting customers from unreasonable 
charges; and (2) the utility investor’s right to just compensation.17  
Regulatory rate approval before ANCR generally applied the “just 
and reasonable” standard.18  This standard has been enshrined by 
statute across the country, endeavoring to balance a utility’s right to a 
reasonable rate of return with protecting consumers from unfair 
pricing.19  Under ANCR, it is instead the utility’s revenue 
requirements for the proposed nuclear facility that help to drive the 
rates recovered.  Utilities with projects that qualify for cost recovery 
are able to recover all prudently incurred costs related to site 
selection, preconstruction, and construction.20  The “just and 
reasonable” standard is not applied to rates collected to cover these 
expenses. 
As a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission member 
 
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/ dockets/orders/ (“In 2006, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 
366.93, F.S., to encourage utility investment in nuclear electric generation by creating an 
alternative cost recovery mechanism.”).  The original 2006 Florida legislation, SB 888, enabled 
the advanced fee described above. S.B. 888, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006), available at 
http://archive.flsenate. gov/data/session/2006/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0888c1.pdf.  In 2008, HB 
7135 added plant-associated transmission lines as a recoverable expense.  H.B. 7135, 2008 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents 
/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=_h7135er.docx&DocumentType=Bill&BillNumber=7135&Session=20
08.  In 2013, SB 1472 added long-term time limits to projects’ recovery.  S.B.1472, 2013 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/1472/ 
BillText/er/PDF.  See generally Joshua Gillin, Florida GOP Says Charlie Crist ‘Made It Easier 
for Duke to Take Your Money’, POLITIFACT (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.politifact.com 
/florida/statements/2014/aug/15/republican-party-florida/florida-gop-says-charlie-crist-made-it-
easier-duke/ (discussing Florida’s recent legislative and political actions on “advance fees” for 
utilities).  
 17. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898) (protecting the right of regulated 
industries to a “fair return” on their investments despite regulatory limits); Fed. Power Comm’n 
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (excluding agency decisions that are “just and 
reasonable” from Smyth v. Ames holding).  
 18. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603; see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 
U.S. 299, 303 (1989) (reviewing an Administrative Law Judge decision that used the “reasonable 
and prudent” standard). 
 19. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133–35 (1877); see also Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis, 296 So. 
2d 482, 488 (Fla. 1974)  (establishing the Florida law equivalent of Munn v. Illinois).   
 20. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.0423 (2014).  Note that Florida’s process is distinct 
from a standard Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) policy because it includes a mechanism 
to cover costs related to pursuing licensing, etc., as they are projected and incurred prior to 
commencing construction.  Nuclear cost recovery clause, PSC-11-0095-FOF-EI, 3–4 (Fla. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Feb. 2, 2011) (admin. final order), available at http://www.psc.state.fl.us/dockets/ 
orders/.  Note also that South Carolina’s nuclear construction cost recovery law states that “the 
[utilities] commission may not rule on the prudency or recoverability of specific items of cost, 
but shall rule instead on the prudency of the decision to incur preconstruction costs for the 
nuclear plant.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-225(D) (2014). 
18_Haber & Mendez_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2015  4:40 PM 
190 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXV:185 
noted, this “is part of the risk to which the Legislature exposed 
Florida customers by passing such an open-ended piece of 
legislation . . . .  The law basically says once the [state’s utility 
commission] approves the need for the plant all prudent costs are 
passed onto the customers.”21  This situation is further complicated by 
the way that need is calculated, which includes considerations other 
than true energy demand.22 
Third, the incentive structure built into policies like ANCR raises 
the question: why should a utility invest in cheaper or more energy-
efficient alternatives, when state governments authorize early rate 
recovery for centralized capital projects regardless of completion?  
Regulation-induced financial incentives are neither new nor 
controversial.  The issue here is that policies like ANCR privilege one 
form of energy production above all others.  Hence, utilities may be 
motivated to seek a license for a particular facility, not because it is 
the best or most-efficient technology but because the potential rates 
garnered will be greater and the investment may be recovered sooner. 
In an industry more accountable to market forces, privileging 
one form of power generating facility would have a limited effect; 
however, electric utilities do not operate in a competitive market.23  
They are state regulated monopolies, sensitive primarily to the rates 
they are authorized to collect and recover by state utility 
commissions.24  Traditionally, this sensitivity already pushed electric 
utilities to pursue base rate increases by building large, centralized 
power plants.25  Their goal was to create more power; not to use it 
 
 21. Ivan Penn, Duke Energy’s Customers Face a Potential $500 Million Bill, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2014), available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/duke-
energys-customers-face-a-potential-500-million-bill/2173654. 
 22. For a review of need determination for electric power plants, see Lisa O. O’Neill, 
Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act: Perpetuating Power Industry Supremacy in the 
Certification Process, 36. U. FLA. L. REV. 817, 831–32 (1984) [hereinafter FEPPSA: Perpetuating 
Power Industry Supremacy].  As an example, present need for additional power is not required 
for the Florida Public Service Commission to determine that new electric power plants should 
be built.  See Panda Energy Int’l v. Jacobs, 813 So. 2d 46, 52, 56 (Fla. 2002) (approving the 
Public Service Commission’s finding of need, based upon its consideration of economic needs 
and cost-effectiveness, in addition to the need for additional energy generating capacity); see 
also FLA. STAT. § 403.519(3)–(4) (2014) (establishing criteria for the Commission to consider in 
determining need for an electrical power plant).   
 23. Gagax, supra note 2, at 63.  
 24. Id.   
 25. Ivan Penn, Utilities Will Ask PSC for Permission to Gut Energy-Saving Goals, TAMPA 
BAY TIMES (July 19, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/utilities-will-ask-
psc-for-permission-to-gut-energy-saving-goals/2189192 [hereinafter Penn, Utilities Will Ask 
PSC]. 
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more efficiently, decentralize its production through diverse methods 
like rooftop solar, or produce innovations in grid-level energy storage 
devices.26  ANCR compounds this problem by providing further 
incentives for electric utilities to shy away from developing 
technologies that use energy efficiently, and encourages additional 
emphasis on constructing costly, new capital projects.  In fact, while 
this comment was being written, Florida’s investor-owned electric 
utilities began advocacy efforts to take this policy even further by 
asking the state to set aside its energy conservation goals.27 
Perhaps on purpose, the electric utility market is not designed to 
be vulnerable to disruption or decentralization.  After all, ensuring a 
reliable electric grid promotes public safety and greater industry 
competition might lead to a less reliable grid.  Nonetheless, policies 
like ANCR do not ensure grid reliability.  As a policy, this type of 
incentive further insulates companies currently providing energy 
services to the public from disruption.  In effect, the present system 
makes energy conservation unappealing for established utilities and 
curtails retail opportunities for alternative technology developers. 
II. POWER PLANT LICENSING—EXPEDIENCY OVER BALANCED 
RESULTS 
Once policymakers enact incentives for investor-owned utilities, 
the actual work of licensing utility projects falls to administrative 
agencies at both the state and federal level.28  These agencies do much 
to regulate the electric industry.  However, the distinct set of 
incentives created by the elected branches of government, guides 
agency staff. 
 
 26. Conversely, states like Florida do set numeric goals for energy conservation and 
demand side management (DSM) programs to push utilities to adopt new technology and 
toward efficient behaviors that minimize residential and commercial usage of electricity.  
See Adoption of Numeric Conservation Goals and Consideration of Nat’l Energy Policy Act 
Standards, PSC-94-1313-FOF-EG (Fla.  Pub. Serv. Comm’n  Oct.  25, 1994) (admin. order 
setting conservation goals) available  at http://www.psc.state.fl.us/dockets/orders/. The drawback 
is that these incentives do not effectively counteract the much larger amounts of funding 
available through programs like ANCR.   
 27. Penn, Utilities Will Ask PSC, supra note 25; Ivan Penn, Lower Energy Conservation 
Goals Will Protect Ratepayers, Utilities Tell PSC, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July. 23, 2014), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/lower-energy-conservation-goals-will-protect-
ratepayers-utilities-tell-psc/2189772.   
 28. See, e.g., David B. Spence, Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform, 
59 PUB.  ADMIN. REV. 425, 426–27 (1999) (describing the founding of the Federal Regulatory 
Energy Agenvy (FERC), its task of licensing hydroelectric projects, and how the FERC adapted 
to meet the limitations Congress later placed upon the FERC).   
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For the federal portion of the nuclear power plant licensing 
process, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversees a safety 
review pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act; an environmental review 
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); and an 
antitrust review.29  Where significant environmental impacts are 
expected under the NEPA review, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other cooperating 
agencies may collaborate to submit an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) to the Office of Federal Activities at the 
Environmental Protection Agency.30  The EIS drafting process entails 
a public comment period as well.31  Final federal approval of new 
reactors is issued by a combined license (COL) that may be valid for 
up to six decades.32 
In recent years, the White House has directed federal agencies 
involved in permitting high-priority infrastructure projects to 
expedite these processes with clear objectives and timeframes.33  The 
President has articulated “the goal of cutting aggregate timelines for 
major infrastructure projects in half, while also improving outcomes 
for communities and the environment . . . .”34  The advantages of 
these directives include improved scheduling and interagency 
coordination.35  The disadvantages are more fundamental: a swift 
permitting process may undermine the quality of review, and the 
infrastructure project’s eventual success.36 
 
 29. Backgrounder: Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N (July. 2005), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/licensing-
process-bg.html.   
 30. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Basic Information, U.S. EPA (June 25, 
2012), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html.   
 31. Id. 
 32. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.104, 54.31 (stating that the combined license is valid for forty years 
and may be renewed for an additional twenty).   
 33. Memorandum on Speeding Infrastructure Development Through More Efficient and 
Effective Permitting and Environmental Review, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201100601 
(Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100601/pdf/DCPD-
20110060 1.pdf. 
 34. Memorandum on Modernizing Federal Infrastructure Review and Permitting 
Regulations, Policies, and Procedures, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201300346 (May 17, 
2013), available at  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300346/pdf/DCPD-201300346.pdf.  
 35. Jena A. MacLean, Utility-Scale Renewable Energy Development on Public Lands: 
Learning From Past Lessons to Improve the Potential for a Low Carbon Future, ABA CTR. FOR 
PROF’L DEV. (July 15, 2014), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/environment_energy_resources/2014/03/43rd-spring-
conference/conference_materials_portal/maclean_jana-ppt.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 36. See id.  Since streamlined permitting processes are generally swift, they may also curtail 
opportunities for public participation, thus limiting public input. 
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In Florida, where the Duke Energy reactors were authorized, the 
state’s Electrical Power Plant Siting Act governs licensing new 
plants.37  This process encourages expediency as well.38  The Act has 
its origins in the 1970s oil embargo and “attempts to balance energy 
needs against their potential environmental impact to insure that the 
location and operation of new power plants will have only minimal 
adverse effects on the environment.”39  Despite this intent, the Act 
promotes two behaviors from state regulators: (1) aversion to delay; 
and (2) ineffective balancing of need against impact.40 
First, the state agency coordinating the licensing process is 
entitled to charge applicant utilities a filing fee to help cover 
administrative and hearing costs.41  Delays and alternative proposals 
increase these costs without affording the agency additional income.42  
Also, if the agency rejects a utility’s application, the utility would 
have to submit a revised application.43  This only creates more work 
for the agency by forcing it to duplicate its effort.44  Moreover, if the 
application qualifies for ANCR, the utility is permitted to recover 
costs related to pursuing a license.45  These costs, which may increase 
with every delay in the licensing process, are then passed on to 
Florida utility customers.  Hence, the agency “has an interest not only 
in approving initial [power] plant certification, but also in doing so 
quickly.”46 
Second, under the Electrical Power Plant Siting Act, one agency 
determines the economic need for a new power plant47 while another 
helps to determine whether adverse environmental impacts exist.48  
 
 37. FLA. STAT. § 403.502 (2014). 
 38. Id. § 403.504 (2014); see also O’Neill, supra note 22, at 826–31, 834 (“FEPPSA has 
resulted in remarkably expedient power plant certification. “).   
 39. O’Neill, supra note 22, at 819–20; FLA. STAT. §§ 403.502, 403.509(3) (2014).   
 40. O’Neill, supra note 22, at 826–31, 834.   
 41. FLA. STAT. § 403.518 (2014). Currently, this agency is Florida’s Department of 
Environmental Protection.   
 42. O’Neill, supra note 22, at 834.    
 43. See id.  (explaining that “denial of an application would probably result in the proposal 
of an alternative site”).   
 44. See id. (stating that refiling applications will require agencies “to duplicate their 
efforts”). 
 45. See FLA. STAT. § 366.93(2) (2014) (requiring the commission to establish rules for 
recovering costs from licensing).   
 46. O’Neill, supra note 22, at 834. 
 47. See FLA. STAT. § 350.01 (2014) (establishing the Florida Public Service Commission); 
FLA.  STAT.  § 403.519(3) (establishing the Florida Public Service Commission as “the sole 
forum” for the determination of “the need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost”). 
 48. See FLA. STAT. § 403.504(1) (2014) (granting the Department of Environmental 
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Florida’s Governor and Cabinet, acting as the Electrical Power Plant 
Siting Board,49 then balance the need against the impact.50  As noted 
earlier, the economic need for a power plant is not based solely on the 
present need for additional energy generating capacity.51  This policy 
makes sense if the only goal is to ensure that sufficient facilities exist 
to secure a consistent electricity supply. 
The Act, however, does not assign value to adverse 
environmental impacts.52  In general, environmental externalities are 
not easily translated into financial terms.53  As one Florida judge 
noted, “[i]t is like putting a known quantity on one side of a scale, and 
then weighing it against an unknown on the other side.”54  Since 
economic need is simpler to quantify, it usually outweighs impacts to 
water quality, air, and wildlife.55  Rather than balancing these interests 
against one another, the current arrangement creates further 
incentive for the Governor and Cabinet to base their licensing 
decision on short-term economic benefits.56  Practically, “any 
determination of need preempts the balancing process.”57  Therefore, 
regulatory incentives like ANCR reward utilities for proposing 
expensive capital projects, while policies like those embodied in 
portions of Florida’s Electrical Power Plant Siting Act push these 
projects through the licensing process. 
 
 
Protection the power to create rules “setting forth environmental precautions to be followed in 
relation to the . . . operation of electrical power plants”).  
 49. Id. § 403.503(8)  (defining the “Board” as “the Governor and Cabinet”).   
 50. Id. § 403.509(3)(a)–(g) (articulating that, in evaluating applications, the board must 
attempt to “[e]ffect reasonable balance between the need for the facility as established pursuant 
to s. 403.519 and the impacts upon air and water quality, fish and wildlife, water resources, and 
other natural resources of the state resulting from the construction and operation of the facility . 
. . .”).  
 51. See Panda Energy Int’l v. Jacobs, 813 So. 2d 46, 52, 56 (Fla. 2002) (approving the Public 
Service Commission’s finding of need, based upon its consideration of economic needs and cost-
effectiveness, in addition to the need for additional energy generating capacity).  
 52. FEPPSA: Perpetuating Power Industry Supremacy, supra note 222, at 830.  
 53. Id. at 832.   
 54. Fla. Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Orlando Util. Comm’n, 436 So. 2d 383, 391 (Fla. Dist.  
Ct. App. 1983) (Sharp, J., dissenting).   
 55. See O’Neill, supra note 22, at 833 (“hundreds of millions of dollars in savings easily 
outweigh an amorphous, economically unquantified environmental impact”). 
 56. See Wade L. Hopping & Carolyn Songer Raepple, A Solution to the Regulatory Maze: 
The Transmission Line Siting Act, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 454 (1980) (speculating that, 
although the board is legally-bound to base its decisions on the evidence on the record, it “tends 
to be more sensitive to political realities than to legal niceties”).   
 57. O’Neill, supra note 22, at 830.   
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE—LIMITED REVIEW OF 
COMPLEX FACTS 
The judiciary also plays a role, although limited, in the electrical 
utility regulation arena.  Generally, the courts act to provide a 
measure of accountability in our constitutional system.  With specific 
regard to infrastructure projects, the judge’s most common role is to 
review administrative decisions resulting from agency licensing 
processes.58  This review normally occurs at the appellate level after 
an agency has taken final action,59 which tends to preserve judicial 
economy.  For the most part, the review focuses on the court’s 
primary area of expertise: legal matters.  Nevertheless, infrastructure 
projects in the energy industry commonly have far reaching impacts 
on consumers and the environment.60  Factual determinations, made 
by the agency or submitted with the license application, typically 
drive the judiciary’s understanding of these impacts.61 
At the federal level, the actions of agencies like the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Army Corps of Engineers, and Fish and Wildlife Service are subject 
to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.62  
Under NEPA, agencies must first fulfill additional procedural 
obligations before proceeding with a project.63  Then, the courts may 
review the adequacy of agency consideration concerning a project’s 
environmental impact.64 
Florida law also provides for judicial review of state 
 
 58. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 524–25 (1978) (establishing that the primary responsibility of courts in a lawsuit regarding 
agency decisions is to review them to see if the agency followed its own decision-making 
procedure). 
 59. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (limiting judicial review of appellate courts to final agency actions). 
 60.  See, e.g., Steve Henn, Sandy Reveals Troubled Past for Long Island Utility, NAT’L PUB.  
RADIO, http://www.npr.org/2012/11/17/165321973/sandy-reveals-troubled-past-for-long-island-
utility (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (describing how mismanagement of the construction of the 
Shoreham nuclear power plant in Long Island led to a successful racketeering case against and 
the near-insolvency of a public utility company); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 
F.2d 872, 874 (arising from local concern that water used for cooling nuclear reactors discharged 
into an abutting estuary was hot enough to kill nearby organisms living in the estuary).  
 61. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 545–46 (excluding factual determinations and 
sufficiency of agency procedure from the purview of reviewing federal courts).  
 62. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012) (providing the terms for judicial review).  
 63. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553 (“NEPA places upon an agency the obligation to 
consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action,” including 
allowing interveners to participate). 
 64. See id. at 551–58 (evaluating the adequacy of the administrative review process 
undertaken by the Atomic Energy Commission).   
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administrative actions.65  To facilitate certain agency proceedings, 
such as licensing a power plant, Florida’s Division of Administrative 
Hearings (DOAH) will assign an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to 
conduct a hearing on the matter.66  The ALJ’s duty is to conduct fact-
finding, make conclusions of law, and recommend a disposition of the 
issue before the agency itself makes a decision.67  These factual 
findings are especially significant when engineering projects and 
complex environmental impacts are at issue.68 
Once the ALJ has made a factual determination or weighed 
evidence, it is difficult, although not impossible, to reverse their 
decision.69  Under Florida law, reviewing courts, and even the agency 
heads empowered to make the final licensing decision, generally 
cannot make their own factual findings or overturn the ALJ’s findings 
unless they are unsupported by “competent substantial evidence.”70  
Legally, “competent substantial evidence” refers to the quantity of 
evidence presented and not its quality.  In licensing a power plant, if 
the applicant utility can provide “reasonable assurances” (essentially, 
“a substantial likelihood that the project will be successfully 
implemented”), an ALJ will usually determine that a fact is based on 
“competent substantial evidence.”71  Depending on the circumstances, 
state appellate courts will review legal conclusions reached by the 
ALJ or the agency under either a de novo or “clearly erroneous” 
standard.72 
 
 65. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (2014).   
 66. The hearing overseen by the ALJ may involve disputed issues of material fact.  It also 
presents the opportunity for parties to offer evidence that competes with the applicant’s view of 
the project.  See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28–106.201 (1997).   
 67. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(k) (2014).   
 68. See, e.g., David Abel, NRC Staff Recommends Renewing License for the Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www. 
boston.com/metrodesk/2012/04/27/nrc-staff-recommends-renewing-license-for-the-pilgrim-
nuclear-power-station-plymouth/HouSwmBA5gkMESO94jyFYJ/story.html (demonstrating 
that even an NRC license renewal for a nuclear power plant may take up to six years and may 
be the subject of further litigation). 
 69. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(k) (2014) (requiring that, in order to reject or modify 
findings of fact, the agency must first determine “from a review of the entire record . . . that the 
findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence”).   
 70. Id.   
 71. Metro Dade Cnty.  v. Coscan Fla., Inc., 609 So. 2d 644, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) 
(requiring the hearing officer to examine proposals to ensure that the project provides 
“reasonable assurance”); see Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl.  
Regulation, 587 So. 2d 1378, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that there was 
“competent, substantial evidence” in support of the agency decision).  
 72. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(7)(d) (2014). (remanding a case occurs upon a finding that an 
agency “erroneously interpreted a provision of law”); Doyle v. Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 794 
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Nonetheless, the facts (and environmental impacts) of a given 
project are essentially determined at an early stage.  This is especially 
significant within energy and environmental law practices because the 
facts are generally more complex, and less easily discovered, than in 
the average civil trial.73  For example, impacts to natural resources 
and the efficacy of mitigation techniques, which require sophisticated 
projections, are very important to the decision whether or not to 
license a power plant.74  In addition, the normal rules of civil 
procedure do not govern the discovery process in these proceedings75 
and hearsay is allowed to play a greater role.76  In short, complicated 
facts are being determined in a setting with fewer procedural 
safeguards.  Accordingly, the licensing agency and the utility have 
tremendous influence in creating the factual record that defines a 
given project’s impact. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR CONSUMERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The combination of policies discussed above has created a 
system that enables utility companies like Duke Energy to collect 
billions of dollars in fees, regardless of whether or not they decide to 
construct the power generating facilities they propose.77  Individually, 
each of these bodies of law is internally logical.  Furthermore, they 
serve legitimate government interests, including judicial economy, 
national energy independence, and, where nuclear power is 
concerned, a decreased reliance on fossil fuels. 
The environmental impacts of facilities that do become 
operational, however, are substantial and direct.  For example, a 
 
So. 2d 686, 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct.  App. 2001) (explaining situations where deference should not be 
afforded to agency decisions and electing to review an agency decision de novo).  
 73. See, e.g., Robert Guy Matthews, Permits Drag On U.S. Mining Projects, WALL ST.  J. 
(Feb. 8, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703822404575019123766644644 
(reviewing some of the complex environmental facts surrounding mining permits). 
 74. For guidance on federal agencies’ handling of impacts and mitigation in the NEPA 
context, see Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of Council for Envtl. Quality, for 
Heads of Fed. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ 
NEPA-CEQ_Mitigation_and_Monitoring_Guidance_14Jan2011.pdf. 
 75. In Florida, for example, DOAH maintains its own uniform rules of procedure.  E.g., 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.  r  28-106.101–106.217 (1997).   
 76. See, e.g., FLA.  STAT.  § 120.57(1)(c) (2014) (“Hearsay evidence may be used for the 
purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence.”).   
 77. See Watchdog Report, supra note 1 (reporting that Duke Energy was allowed to keep 
$819.5 million with a further $350 million slated for collection from its customers for the 
construction of a power plant, even though plans to build the plant were cancelled); see also 
Bachman, supra note 1 (citing examples of utilities “recoup[ing] their engineering and planning 
costs from customers years before any construction begins on new plants”). 
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power plant must use millions of gallons of water per day to cool 
nuclear reactors.78  Likewise, in Florida, the National Park Service 
recently issued a draft EIS that contemplates the possibility of 
constructing transmission lines, associated with expanding a power 
plant, within the current boundaries of Everglades National Park.79  
These impacts should not be glossed over despite regulators’ desire to 
expedite new project approvals. 
Additionally, there is little opportunity for utility customers to 
affect these industry practices.  Meaningful participation in legal 
proceedings is not only difficult and cost-prohibitive, but may also 
require early intervention.  The technical subjects at issue are 
partially to blame for this difficulty and expense.  In Florida, a recent 
DOAH hearing related to licensing a power plant produced a 
transcript over 8,000-pages that cost about $160,000 in total to 
purchase.80  Obviously, the size of these records has consequences for 
the judicial review process.  Similarly, the lack of transparency and 
shortage of opportunities for consumer participation are also 
significant problems that limit public accountability.  Recently, 
Florida legislators rejected a proposal that would have required 
utilities to disclose ANCR fees to customers in their monthly electric 
bill.81  Moreover, public comment was not allowed at the regulatory 
hearing when utilities sought to restrict energy conservation 
programs.82 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although a dependable electricity supply is critical to 
contemporary society, the incentive structure created by the policies 
 
 78. See Jenny Staletovich, Feds OK Hotter Water to Operate Turkey Point Nuclear 
Reactors, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/ 
miami-dade/article1978565.html (discussing a request to allow fourteen million gallons of water 
a day to remove heat created by power plants); Jenny Staletovich, Hot Cooling Canals Threaten 
Shutdown of Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plants, MIAMI HERALD (July 16, 2014), http://www. 
miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1975835.html (recounting power 
plant request for “daily injections of millions of gallons” of water for cooling processes).   
 79. Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Acquisition of Florida Power and Light 
Company Land in the East Everglades Expansion Area, Everglades National Park, Florida, 79 
Fed.  Reg.  2688, 2688–90 (Jan. 15, 2014).  As an additional matter of disclosure, the power plant 
expansion mentioned above is the subject of litigation in which both authors of this comment 
are involved.  The issues litigated in that case are not discussed here. 
 80. The cost of this document was split among four parties, including the City of Miami and 
the project applicant.   
 81. Watchdog Report, supra note 1.   
 82. See Utilities Will Ask PSC, supra note 25 (detailing the Public Service Commissioner’s 
decision not to hold a public hearing, but to allow the public to submit written comments). 
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described above promotes expediting new power plant licensing at 
the cost of other goals like energy conservation, balanced 
environmental impact considerations, and greater industry 
innovation.  Where ANCR statutes have been enacted, modern 
regulatory oversight of electric utilities disproportionately rewards 
pursuing expensive capital projects instead of energy-efficient 
programs, and instills a tendency to fast-track review within licensing 
agencies. 
In Florida, the Electrical Power Plant Siting Act enables utilities 
to build new power plants when there is not a present need for the 
additional electric generation capacity.83  If the power plant project 
qualifies for the state’s version of nuclear cost recovery, additional 
fees are authorized based on prudent utility expenditures, without 
consideration of the “just and reasonable” standard that was designed 
to protect consumer interests.84  Under this law, recovery is available 
for the entire licensing process and for preconstruction activities, even 
if the utility later decides to abandon the project.85  This arrangement 
does not encourage thoughtful investment by utility companies. 
Nationally, administrative procedure and processes for power 
plant licensing reinforce this behavior through expedited capital 
project review and insufficient opportunities to contest industry 
license applications.  The difficulty of properly valuing important 
environmental resources further complicates the regulator’s task. 
The issue at hand is not that each of these individual policies is 
baseless, nor that power plants are poor infrastructure investments.  
The regulatory dilemma is far more complex than deciding whether a 
single project or policy is sound.  Rather, it is the combination of 
policies presently in force that discourages accountability, efficient 
energy usage, and even grid reliability.  This problem will persist so 
long as the significant financial and administrative incentives created 
under current law are left unbalanced. 
 
 83. See Panda Energy Int’l v. Jacobs, 813 So. 2d 46, 54 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting the argument 
that a utility must “demonstrate an actual present in-service need for all the electrical power to 
be generated at the proposed plant”).  
 84. See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 315 (upholding a regulatory scheme which 
prevented cost recovery for cancelled power plants).  
 85. See FLA. STAT. § 366.93(6) (2014) (providing for recovery of “prudent preconstruction 
and construction costs” for a cancelled power plant).  Recall that vendor and legal fees are costs 
associated with licensing that are eligible for recovery.   
